I. Full description of the experiment
that depended on their choices. 2 The participants then completed the main parts of the experiment: 1) the truthtelling task, 2) the effort task, and 3) the measurement of protected values. (These tasks were not labelled for the participants.) The experiment ended with some final questions serving mainly as control variables; then all the participants were paid. For simplicity, we describe the procedure for only one of the randomized orders of tasks. For both the truthtelling and the effort tasks, participants first were required to demonstrate their understanding of the tasks and of the rules of the experiment.
1) TRUTHTELLING TASK.
In the truthtelling task, each participant was placed in the situation of a CEO who had to announce earnings per share for the previous quarter. The participants were told that the variable component of their salaries depended on the earnings they announced. They were also told that the market currently anticipated the announcement of 35 cents per share as earnings, 3 but that the true earnings were 31 cents per share. The participants were told that they could announce earnings of 35 cents per share while remaining within legal accounting limits, 4 and that the decision would be solely theirs. They were also informed that they would be paid an amount based on the CEO compensation (according to their choices). This additional experimental payoff was converted into real money at the rate of CHF 100,000 = CHF 0.5. Importantly, participants earned less when choosing to tell the truth.
The participants were then told to submit their financial statements that day.
Specifically, they were provided, in a randomized manner, with one of two orders of the following choice tasks:
2 At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was about US $1 = CHF 1.15. 3
The actual term for the equivalent of cents in the Swiss currency is "Rappen," and the experiment used the precise Swiss terminology, that is, a choice between 31 Rappen and 35 Rappen, where 100 Rappen = CHF 1. For simplicity, we refer to "cents" within the text. 4 Therefore, risk preferences of individuals did not matter as their choices were not based on the trade-off between the expected benefits and costs of committing a crime.
Which earnings will you announce?
__ 31 cents per share --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 60,000 (CHF 0.30).
__ 35 cents per share --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 31 cents per share --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 120,000 (CHF 0.60).
__ 31 cents per share --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 180,000 (CHF 0.90).
__ 31 cents per share --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 240,000 (CHF 1.20).
__ 31 cents per share --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
Manipulation check: As our manipulation check, the participants were provided with four items and asked, using a 5-point scale ranging from -2 to +2, the extent to which they judged announcing 31 cents as dishonest vs. honest, manipulative vs. not manipulative, and short-term-oriented vs. long-term-oriented. The same was also done for the 35-cent option. To verify that participants correctly perceived their options, we also asked participants the extent to which they associated announcing 31 cents (or 35 cents) with personal costs or personal benefits (-2 = associated with personal costs to +2 = associated with personal benefits).
2) EFFORT TASK. Participants engaged in a simple calculation task, testing the prediction that protected values of truthfulness would play no role in tasks without an honesty/dishonesty dimension. This also allowed us to examine somewhat the possibility that participants' choices were affected by concerns regarding the experimenter's wealth or by aspects of the experiment's design (for example, the order of choices). In this task, all participants were given the role of a manager who could affect the firm's value and their own remuneration by the amount and the accuracy of the work that they did. Participants were then provided with the following slide:
In this task, you can increase earnings per share and, therefore, your compensation, by working.
You will work on five sets of calculations. In each set, you can decide whether to do 1 or 5 simple calculations. Doing 5 calculations takes approximately five times as long as doing 1 calculation, and you will be paid more for this. The compensation you receive for 1 and for 5 calculations will vary over the five sets of calculations. Moreover, you will receive CHF 0.2 for each correct calculation.
Participants were shown an example of a calculation, such as 3 + 4 -5 + 8 + 3 -9 = ? The participants then read the following screen, one set of choices at a time:
How many calculations do you wish to do? __ 1 calculation --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 60,000 (CHF 0.30).
__ 5 calculations --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50). __ 1 calculation --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 5 calculations --In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
On this task, participants could earn between CHF 4.50 (for always choosing one calculation, done incorrectly) and CHF 12.50 (for always choosing five calculations, done correctly).
3) MEASUREMENT OF PROTECTED VALUES.
According to the correspondence (or compatibility) principle established by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) , values and behavior need to be assessed at a similar level of specificity in order to be able to uncover a link between the two. This principle underlies the measure developed by Tanner, Ryf, and Hanselmann (2009), which we used to assess the extent to which participants held truthfulness as a protected value and, therefore, felt committed to truthtelling. Since we are studying earnings management behaviors, we adapted the introduction of their questionnaire to the present context. The questionnaire (see Section II of the Appendix) contains two highly correlated subscales designed to approach protected values from different angles. Five items assessed the participants' reactions to violations of honesty by a hypothetical CEO reporting company information. This represents an indirect approach because the decisions of others were being evaluated. Four additional items assessed the participants' own protected values more directly by examining how much importance they attributed to specific features of protected values (such as trade-off reluctance, unwillingness to sacrifice a value, or incommensurability), again referring to the specific context of a hypothetical CEO's decisions regarding the reporting of information.
The participants also had to answer another set of questions, which served as control variables. After the experiment, the participants anonymously received their payments of CHF 8 plus their earnings. The average total payment was slightly less than CHF 30.5. As explained earlier, by using codes to distribute earnings, we took as much care as possible to ensure anonymity. That is, we tried to remove any possible grounds for expecting reciprocity. It is, therefore, unlikely that a desire to appear honest affected the participants' behavior systematically. See Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) for a study of how publicly displayed monetary incentives can be less effective in promoting pro-social behavior than privately displayed incentives.
EFFORT CHOICE. This represented the dependent variable in the effort task. It took on the value of 1 if a participant chose to do five calculations (high effort), and the value of 0 if a participant chose to do one calculation (low effort).
D. Explanatory variables
ECOST. This was a within-participants variation. Costs of truthfulness derived from the amount of money a participant forfeited by announcing 31 cents (that is, Cronbach's Alpha is a measure of the reliability and the internal consistency of an instrument. The measure ranges from 0 to 1 and will generally increase when the correlations between the items increase. We also did the analysis using the direct and indirect subscales separately, with similar results. 
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL VARIABLES. SEX, AGE, and STUDIES served as
control variables. SEX was equal to 1 for female participants and to 0 for male participants. AGE was equal to each participant's age in completed years.
PSYCHOLOGY was equal to 1 for psychology students ("psychologists") and to 0 otherwise. OTHER was equal to 1 for participants from fields other than psychology and economics and to 0 otherwise. ECONOMICS was the omitted category.
II. Protected Values survey
According to the correspondence (or compatibility) principle established by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) , values and behavior need to be assessed at a similar level of specificity in order to be able to uncover a link between the two. This principle underlies the measure developed by Tanner, Ryf, and Hanselmann 
B. Quantitative implications for preference parameters
In the main text, we found that PV serves as a useful measure to organize the data. Here, we provide a quantitative interpretation of the findings for PV. (The other candidate measures for intrinsic costs of lying were insignificant.) For PV, a useful way to interpret the results quantitatively is offered by slightly rewriting the preference specification in equation
between the utilities of truthtelling and of lying is here given by
In this formulation, the role of intrinsic costs of lying is split up even more explicitly than in the formulation in the main paper, although they are 
Thus, under the maintained distributional assumptions, after relabeling and combining coefficients,
where     is the logistic cumulative distribution function. For a model without other demographic controls (which would show up in the constant), we therefore have, we therefore have
For k i , the parameters 0 Note that factors reflected neither in the model nor in the experiment may shift the attractiveness of truthfulness. For example, an anticipated loss of reputation in case of cheating may make lying less attractive at a given cost of truthfulness, thus adding to the personal moral cost of lying. These external factors would, therefore, complement and enhance the power of the discount factor k i . becomes interesting mostly when there is variation in protected values across agents. 
